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ABSTRACT: The special operations community could best address the
perceived ethical crisis it faces by professionalizing as an institution. While
earlier assessments have attributed special operations forces’ ethical issues to a
focus on mission accomplishment that led to a broken force generation process
and a high operations tempo, such diagnoses obscure a more comprehensive
solution. Using sociologist Andrew Abbott’s work on professions as a
framework, this article explores the benefits of building the kinds of institutions
that can claim a jurisdiction, develop and certify expert knowledge, and
establish and apply a code of ethics that addresses special operations unique
concerns so that it builds trust and better serves the American people.
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S

pecial operations forces (SOF) appear to be experiencing an ethical
crisis. According to a report last year in Rolling Stone, special operators
routinely abused and even smuggled drugs while conducting operations.
More concerning are the times special operators were involved in, and occasionally
got away with, murder.1 Another report described special operators engaging in
extremist, radicalized, and racist discussions, sometimes advocating violence
against elected US officials in secret Facebook groups.2 Additionally, multiple
high-profile war-crime cases have recently occurred, including those of Eddie
Gallagher (who was accused of one count of murder and two counts of attempted
murder but convicted for posing for a photo with the corpse of a detainee) and US
Army Special Forces Major Matthew Golestyn, who was accused of murdering an
Afghan man his unit had detained.3
This ethical crisis is not limited to US special operations forces. According to
the 2020 Brereton Report by the Australian Department of Defence, Australian
special forces have also been involved in killing civilians and other abuses in
1. Seth Harp, “The Fort Bragg Murders,” Rolling Stone (website), April 18, 2021, https://www.rollingstone.com
/culture/culture-features/fort-bragg-murders-1153405/.
2. Carol E. Lee, “In Secret Facebook Groups, America’s Best Warriors Share Racist Jabs, Lies about 2020,
Even QAnon Theories,” NBC News (website), April 16, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/secret
-facebook-groups-america-s-best-warriors-share-racist-jabs-n1263985.
3. Stephen Losey, “Eddie Gallagher vs. the World: After War Crimes Trial, Notorious SEAL Is Out to
Settle Scores,” Military.com (website), June 26, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/06/26/eddie
-gallagher-vs-world-after-war-crimes-trial-notorious-seal-out-settle-scores.html;
and
Dave
Phillips,
“Army Denies Request by Soldier Pardoned by Trump, Setting Up Showdown,” New York Times (website),
January 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/us/mathew-golsteyn-army-war-crime.html.
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Afghanistan.4 The report cites credible evidence Australian special operators
wrongfully killed 39 Afghan civilians—news that has generated much of the same
kind of soul-searching currently happening in the United States.5
Crises like these are as attributable to the institution as they are to the individual.
Indeed, United States Special Operations Command issued the Comprehensive
Review in January 2020 to address this point. The report attributed these ethical
failures, in part, to a focus on force employment and mission accomplishment,
leading to a broken force generation (FORGEN) process and a high operations
tempo (OPTEMPO) that impeded the recruitment, assessment, and deployment
of fully trained operators and leaders.6
This diagnosis obscures the solution. Fixing these problems may result in a
highly skilled force, but that is not the same as a highly professional one. Whereas
a highly skilled force is proficient at performing tasks, a professional force
understands how these tasks collectively serve a greater social good. The point
here is not to assess whether the SOF community has a crisis but to emphasize
the opportunity the current situation provides to professionalize more fully by
addressing institutional shortcomings that diminish the ability to construct an
effective professional identity.
Special operators may be professionals of a sort. However, until special
operations designates a jurisdiction over which it has the autonomy to exercise
judgment, the organization is better characterized as a bureaucracy that manages a
highly skilled force. Sociologist Andrew Abbott describes professional expertise as
necessary to diagnose, treat, and make inferences about the problems professionals
are called upon to solve.7 Employing Abbott’s framework, I suggest a better way
to address these issues and enable the SOF community to examine its ethical and
operational challenges.

Diagnoses
Whether reported cases of ethical failure in special operations forces rise to
the level of crisis is difficult to say given the anecdotal nature of the evidence.
In 2018 and 2019, however, the severity of these failures motivated Congress
4. Ben Doherty, “How the ‘Good War’ Went Bad: Elite Soldiers from Australia, UK, and US Face a Reckoning,”
Guardian (website), June 1, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/jun/02/how-the-good
-war-went-bad-elite-soldiers-from-australia-uk-and-us-face-a-reckoning.
5. Christopher Knaus, “Key Findings of the Brereton Report into Allegations of Australian War Crimes in
Afghanistan,” Guardian (website), November 18, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020
/nov/19/key-findings-of-the-brereton-report-into-allegations-of-australian-war-crimes-in-afghanistan.
6. Inited States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Comprehensive Review (MacDill Air Force Base,
FL: USSOCOM, January 23, 2020), 5–7.
7. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988), 52.
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to direct a review of special operations accountability, misconduct, ethics, and
professionalism.8 In response, United States Special Operations Command issued
a report in January 2020 that found no “systemic” ethical failures. The report
acknowledged a high operational tempo and certain aspects of special operations
culture had set conditions for ethical failures. Specifically, the high operational
tempo disrupted the normal FORGEN process and caused a “cascading effect”
impacting leader development and unit integrity.9
Additionally, the review found some services overemphasized physical
training at the expense of professional development. Thus, special operators
were highly skilled when they joined special operations organizations, but they
lacked a fully developed professional identity and ethos. The report also found
the lack of exposure to originating service cultures, and the specialized attention
and amenities operators received further risked creating a sense of entitlement.
Moreover, the level of quality control over assessment, selection, and training
varied among services and special operations components, causing acculturation
to be inconsistent.10
The report’s findings were met with a mixed response. Writing in the Washington
Post, David Ignatius described the report as an “important step,” though the report
may have been “careful . . . perhaps to a fault” in its language.11 Less receptive,
Rolling Stone described the report as “mostly a whitewash, full of vague language
about improving leadership and accountability.”12 Both responses likely hold
truth. The report helpfully describes how ethical failures are attributable to the
institution as much as the individual. By understating the role the institution (as
a system) plays in setting the conditions for these failures, the report obscures the
institutional remedies available to address the conditions for ethical failure.
As an institution, special operations has been hampered in its ability to control
the recruitment, assessment, and professional development of its personnel
because of its dependency on external organizations to manage those processes.
Although the establishment of US Special Operations Command as a unified
command solved many operational concerns at the time, the most important
elements of what it means to be in a profession were left to the other services,

8. Meghann Myers, “The Pentagon Is Reviewing the Special Operations Community after a Series of
High-Profile Scandals,” ArmyTimes (website), December 5, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your
-army/2018/12/05/the-pentagon-is-reviewing-the-special-operations-community-after-a-series-of-high-profile
-scandals/.
9. USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review, 25–32.
10. USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review, 42.
11. David Ignatius, “Special Operations Forces Are Stretched to the Danger Point,” Washington Post (website),
January 28, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/special-operations-forces-are-stretched-to-the
-danger-point/2020/01/28/c6c3898a-421a-11ea-aa6a-083d01b3ed18_story.html.
12. Harp, “Fort Bragg Murders.”
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which are effectively other professions.13 At this point, no single institution
oversees the professional development and certification of special operators over
one jurisdiction.
Compounding these institutional difficulties, the complexity of the operating
environment also contributes to the current crisis. Writing on the Small Wars
Journal website, one special operations officer argued the community’s ethical issues
primarily arise from special operations soldiers being “selected for a willingness
and aptitude to conduct traditionally immoral acts, trained to be proficient at
the conduct of those acts, but then expected to refrain from those acts outside
of approved operational circumstances.” In response, the author recommends
a “bifurcated ethics system” that differentiates operational and nonoperational
environments.14 Echoing this sentiment, another special operator serving a federal
prison sentence told Rolling Stone special operators act in the “grey zone” where
morality and ethics are “in the eye of the beholder,” “everything goes” as long as
the mission is accomplished, and any indiscretions remain outside the public eye.15
Although anecdotal, both views reflect a misunderstanding of the roles
professionals play in society. Where professions serve a social good (such as health,
justice, or security), professionals have a prima facie ethical obligation to provide
that service. For example, emergency rooms are required to ensure patients are
stabilized and treated, regardless of their ability to pay.16 Thus, professionals are
not asked to do unethical things; rather, professionals are asked to do things that
would be unethical for nonprofessionals to do. Professional knowledge is highly
specialized, and those without it will be unable to provide the profession’s service
and, in some cases, could harm the client.17
Notably, Abbott rejects the idea professions must somehow serve society.
Yet, Abbott acknowledges some professions, like the military, could qualify as a
“special calling” because of the nature of the work and a sense of corporateness
in members’ individual roles. Writing in 1988, Abbott observed such
professionalism was generally in decline in the United States.18 This point is
important because an occupation can count as a profession without needing to
reconcile its professional ethics with personal ones. But where the provision of a
13. Bryan D. Brown, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM
History and Research Office, 2007), 12.
14. Dan Pace, “A House Divided: A Look at SOF Values,” Small Wars Journal (website), February 25, 2021,
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/house-divided-look-sof-values.
15. Harp, “Fort Bragg Murders.”
16. “Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) Fact Sheet,” American College of
Emergency Physicians (website), accessed on May 10, 2022, https://www.acep.org/life-as-a-physician/ethics
--legal/emtala/emtala-fact-sheet/.
17. Eliot Freidson, Professionalism, Tte Third Logic: On the Practice of Knowldege (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001), 17.
18. Andrew Abbott, “The Army and the Theory of Professions,” in The Future of the Army Profession,
ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 528–30.
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good or service risks harm—whether to the client or others—professions must
ensure they have effective institutions able to educate, train, certify, and, perhaps
most importantly, govern professionals to ensure their acts serve the greater good
and can stand up to ethical scrutiny.
This obligation points to another challenge for special operations forces.
Although a subjective approach to ethics like the ones expressed above is wrong
in any environment, the norms for operations below the threshold of war are not
well established, well understood, or even normative. In this environment, weaker
adversaries “punch above their weight” by employing technology, proxies, and other
means to bypass stronger actors’ military forces and inflict substantial harm, often
while avoiding accountability. Where actors evade accountability, their targets have
little choice but to engage in reprisals to discourage and deter future aggressions.
Reprisals, of course, set conditions for escalation, which risks a wider conflict for
otherwise limited ends.19 These conditions, however, do not mean unethical acts
are permitted or ethics does not apply. Rather, the under-governed environment in
which special operators work requires professionals who can conduct themselves
ethically within a profession that can tell them how.

Treatment
To remedy the situation, the Comprehensive Review recommends US
Special Operations Command improve its validating requirements to ensure
the FORGEN process can generate fully manned and trained organizations.
The review also recommends better development of leaders who can provide
increased accountability and oversight.20 These recommendations are good,
but they miss the gap the review identifies in special operations recruitment,
assessment, and professional development. As the review notes, individuals enter
special operations before they have been fully acculturated into their service
profession, and, after joining, their development focuses on skills rather than
the profession.21 Consequently, a gap between professional identity and practice
emerges that is unlikely to be remedied by more professional or ethics training or
education. Rather, this gap suggests special operations as an enterprise must fully
professionalize before it can expect its members to act as professionals.
Before examining what fully professionalizing special operations means, it is
worth clarifying how a professional perspective can improve ethical reasoning
and create conditions for more ethical behavior. Take for instance the approach
articulated in A Special Operations Force Ethics Field Guide: 13 Ethical Battle Drills
19. C. Anthony Pfaff, “Military Ethics below the Threshold of War,” Parameters 50, no. 2 (Summer 2020):
69–70, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss2/10/.
20. USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review, 69.
21. USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review, 41–43.
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for SOF Leaders. Produced by the US Special Operations Command chaplain’s
office, the field guide is based on a business ethics text developed by two Brigham
Young University business professors.22 The guide characterizes moral dilemmas
as a finite set of choices between “right versus right,” where actors understand
their options as two “highly prized values,” such as keeping a promise to honor
confidentiality versus loyalty to a friend.23
The problem with this “right versus right” framing is it oversimplifies the
complexities of practical moral reasoning and downplays the importance of
professional judgment and experience. For example, one “battle drill” poses a
dilemma in which one special operator observes another stealing thermal scopes.
The dilemma arises because the thief saved the life of the special operator, and
turning the thief in would ruin his career, if not land him in prison. The situation
appears to pit loyalty to a friend to whom one has a special obligation against the
organization, which would suffer from the loss of thermal scopes.
Framing the situation in this way creates a false dilemma from a professional,
ethical perspective. Loyalty alone is insufficient to generate ethical obligation; to
whom or what one is loyal matters in the context of ethics. As legal scholar George
Fletcher stated, “Blind adherence to any object of loyalty—whether friend, lover,
or nation—converts loyalty into idolatry.”24 More to the point, constructing the
dilemma in this way obscures the professional obligation special operators have as
stewards of their profession to conserve and employ appropriately the resources
the American people have provided. Upon more careful analysis, seeing the two
rights here is difficult. The special operator should have turned in his friend, and
his friend, if he had any professionalism left, should understand why the special
operator had to do it.
Another more tragic dilemma illustrated in the battle drills is an operator’s
choice whether to shoot an armed nine-year-old child who is about to
shoot other soldiers maneuvering in a firefight.25 This case could easily
be framed as a choice between two wrongs, which would better reflect its
tragic nature. Under the laws of armed conflict, shooting the child may be
permissible because the laws allow one to attack persons participating in

22. Dan Rascon, “BYU Professors Create Ethics Field Guide to Help US Special Forces,” KSL TV (website),
February 23, 2021, https://ksltv.com/456124/byu-professors-create-ethics-field-guide-to-help-us-special
-forces/?.
23. George T. Youstra, A Special Operations Force Ethics Field Guide: 13 Ethical Battle Drills for SOF Leaders
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM, 2021), 7.
24. George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), 6.
25. Youstra, Ethics Field Guide, 30.
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hostilities. Seeing shooting the child as right, however, is difficult.26 A more
professional frame would account for professionals incurring an additional
burden of risk, requiring them to consider alternative responses such as finding
ways to disrupt the child’s aim or warn the soldiers the child is about to engage.27
In tragic dilemmas, regardless of the choice made, moral residue and reasons
for regret and remorse will always exist; that is what makes the situation tragic.28
Seeing either choice as “right,” in any sense of the word, downplays the complex
emotional response a special operator might have. If these emotional responses
are left unaddressed, they can contribute to psychological stresses that potentially
create the conditions for future unethical behavior. A code of professional ethics
can help individuals mediate these stresses by providing a framework for evaluating
practical choices, even in the heat of the moment. Moreover, institutions are
obligated to provide the tools for better ethical outcomes, resulting in better
alternatives and preparing professionals practically, ethically, and psychologically
to reduce the chance for and degree of stress.
US Special Operations Command has engaged in efforts, such as those
associated with the Preservation of the Force and Family initiative, that address
physical, psychological, cognitive, social, and spiritual conditions that can enable
ethical violations.29 Such initiatives are an important part of any comprehensive
solution, but they do not address the fundamental professional and ethical
concerns necessary for effective reform.
The field guide is not a governing document for special operations; therefore,
one must be careful about drawing too broad a conclusion about special operations
ethics. Also, in fairness to the guide, the battle-drill examples are real-world cases,
and the special operators may have perceived their situations as “right versus
right” dilemmas. Well-trained and well-educated professionals should not see
such situations in this way. While ethical dilemmas may be difficult and tragic,
a well-conceived professional ethic resolves the tension by reconciling personal
values to professional ones.

Inference
Based on the above analysis, special operations forces may not be having an
ethical crisis so much as a professional one. Exacerbating the problem is special
26. John Cherry and Michael Rizzotti, “Understanding Self-Defense and the Law of Armed Conflict,”
Lieber Institute (website), March 9, 2021, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/understanding-self-defense-law-armed
-conflict/.
27. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New York:
Basic Books, 2006), 155.
28. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 71–75.
29. “About USSOCOM Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF),” USSOCOM (website),
April 20, 2021, https://www.socom.mil/POTFF/Pages/About-POTFF.aspx.

118

Parameters 52(3) Autumn 2022

operations is not really a profession. A profession entails specialized knowledge
in service to society, allowing professionals to exercise autonomy over a specific
jurisdiction.30 The medical profession, for instance, involves specialized knowledge
about human health applied to sustain or improve the health of patients. Because
these professional have autonomy over a specific jurisdiction, they can act in ways
nonprofessionals cannot.31 For example, only medical professionals are certified
and permitted to conduct surgery or prescribe drugs.
Moreover, membership in a profession is contingent upon completing a
certification process created and assessed by other members of the profession.
Doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals are certified by attending
medical school. As they progress within their chosen specialties, the professionals
undergo additional education and training. Professions also have a code of ethics
to ensure their members continue to serve a greater good.32 Again, the medical
example is instructive because the codes obligate members to practice competency,
compassion, and the provision of care, among other qualities necessary for the
medical profession to fulfill its role.33
Professional codes require an understanding of professional purpose and
the knowledge required to fulfill this purpose. Samuel Huntington famously
argued the essential function of the military is successful armed combat, and he
characterized military expertise as the “management of violence.”34 Managing
violence requires more than tactical skill; it also involves organizing, training,
and equipping the force and planning and directing its operations and activities
in and outside combat.35 Within the military, services carve out jurisdictions and
build expert knowledge around them. For instance, the Army claims Landpower
as its jurisdiction and “the ethical design, generation, support, and application of
landpower, primarily in unified land operations, and all supporting capabilities
essential to accomplish the mission in defense of the American people” as its expert
knowledge.36 Other services have similar statements specifying their jurisdictions,
roughly corresponding to the five domains of warfighting: land, air, maritime,
space, and information (including cyberspace).37 Regardless of the jurisdiction

30. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 8–10.
31. Abbott, System of Professions, 60.
32. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 9–10.
33. “Code of Medical Ethics Overview,” American Medical Association (website), accessed on July 8, 2021,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview.
34. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 11.
35. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 11.
36. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), The Army Profession, Army Doctrine Reference
Publication 1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2015), 5-1.
37. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: JCS, October 22,
2018), IV-1.
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a service claims, the burden is on the service to determine the knowledge the
members need to claim the jurisdiction.
Military expert knowledge comprises four fields: military-technical,
moral-ethical, political-cultural, and human development.

•
•

Technical expertise ensures the profession is effective.

•

Political expertise includes cultural knowledge and covers how the
profession interacts with external actors—which, in the case of the
military, includes the US government, the American people, allies
and partners, and civilian populations where the military operates.

•

Human development involves inspiring people to serve and then
providing them with the professional development necessary to
become effective certified leaders.38

Ethical expertise determines the norms governing the service the
profession provides and ensures the trust of the client.

These different elements of professional expertise are necessary so professionals
can fulfill client needs, maintain client trust, develop the talent necessary for
sustaining and growing the profession, and manage relations with external actors
who have a stake in the profession’s activities.
The trust of the client is critical to the health of a profession. Professionals must
put the needs of their clients first.39 Without this trust, clients will look elsewhere
for service, undermining the profession’s jurisdiction, or impose external regulation
and oversight, thus eroding the profession’s autonomy. Unlike the professions of
law and medicine (the clients of which are members of society, the military’s client
is the state to whom it must provide expert advice on the application of force in
defense of the society the state represents.40
No occupation is ever fully professionalized because humans are frequently
neither fully competent nor fully ethical. This limitation is also built into the design
of professional practice. Professions usually require extensive bureaucracies to
sustain their practices and manage scarce resources, so they are used to maximum
effect. Bureaucratic demands, however, are often at odds with professional ones.
Where professionals create expert knowledge and apply it to new situations,
38. Richard A. Lacquement Jr., “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions
of Practice,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston:
McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 217.
39. Anne C. Ozar, “The Plausibility of Client Trust of Professionals,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 33,
no. 1 (2014): 90.
40. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 11–18.
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bureaucrats emphasize efficiency and maintaining the status quo.41 The resulting
tension is evident in the medical field where, for example, a doctor may wish to
prescribe an expensive treatment, but the hospital administrator will not approve it
because the treatment will result in fewer resources for other patients.
Favoring the professional ideal over the bureaucratic may encourage an
innovative service, but one that is likely incapable of delivering on a large scale.
If the bureaucratic is favored over the professional, service provision can get
overwhelmed by process and regulation.42 For this reason, a profession’s status as
a profession should never be taken for granted. Resolving the tension in either
direction undermines the service provided, which, in turn, undermines the trust
of the client. Such an effect occurred in the post–Vietnam War Army, wherein
stifled innovation and diminished training and discipline were not overcome until
the Army renewed its emphasis on defeating the Soviets and developed education,
training, and capabilities to match.43 The Army’s professional status was questioned
again in the 1990s, when the emphasis on large-scale combat operations displaced
other security concerns related to failed states in the Balkans and elsewhere.44
The point here is not that clients set a profession’s jurisdiction. When
confronted with a problem that falls outside the profession’s capabilities but within
its jurisdiction, professionals are obligated to generate new capabilities—especially
if no other profession would be a better fit for the problem. For instance, when
the coronavirus pandemic broke out in early 2020, it was the role and obligation
of medical professionals to develop a vaccine. The pandemic also required
the medical profession to expand capacity—a feat it was not always able to
accomplish. Because capacity was limited, the profession recommended restriction
on movement and social contact to lower demand. Some of these restrictions drew
objections from the public and brought into question—rational or not—how much
the public trusted the medical profession. Therefore, in pursuit of the social good,
the execution of professional responsibilities can require constant negotiation
between the needs of the client and the particular social good the profession was
created to provide.
This tension between the profession and the bureaucracy is enduring.
Professional services are a finite resource rarely sufficient to meet demand.
Bureaucratic hierarchy, process, and other requirements often displace notions of
41. Don M. Snider, “The US Army as a Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed.
Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 15.
42. Snider, “Army as a Profession,” 15–16.
43. Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, “Serving the American People: A Historical View of the
Army Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins
(Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 102; and Suzanne C. Nielsen, An Army Transformed: The US Army’s
Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College Press, 2010), 36–39, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/343/.
44. Snider, “Army as a Profession,” 14–20; and Wong and Johnson, “Serving the American People,” 103–4.
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personal and social responsibility, especially when they conflict with bureaucratic
efficiency. The choice for the professional is not “either/or”; the choice is
“both/and.” Bureaucratic requirements are necessary for the large-scale provision
of a professional service and critical for accountability and transparency.
Professionals must “do the heavy lifting” to balance bureaucratic requirements in
ways that maintain a level of efficiency that preserves clients’ trust and bolsters the
jurisdiction and autonomy necessary to ensure professional effectiveness.
Thinking a particular professional practice consisted of one group of
expert professionals and another group of skilled bureaucrats would be wrong.
A healthy profession’s members must play both roles. They can, however, rely
on nonprofessionals or professionals from other fields to improve operations.
While human resource professionals working in a law firm are not members
of the legal profession, this status does not make their contributions any less
important. Professionals must know how to use nonprofessional contributions
to apply expert knowledge successfully.
Bureaucracies are not the only things able to undermine a profession. Often,
specific policies that seem effective can set conditions for ethical failure in
practice. As Peter Olsthoorn observes, the military encourages social cohesion and
physical courage by instilling a sense of shame should soldiers fail their comrades
in combat.45 High social cohesion, however, can crowd out the conditions
necessary for moral courage—understood here as overcoming the fear of
humiliation, shame, or loss of status when confronting wrongdoing.46 When
overcoming these fears and confronting wrongdoing negatively affects membership,
members of highly cohesive groups often perceive the cost of confrontation
to be too high.
Thus, the Rolling Stone article describing the special operations ethos as
focusing almost exclusively on mission accomplishment and avoiding
embarrassment is not surprising. However, a better-developed professional
identity can address the negative conditions high social cohesion can create
and preserve the positive conditions necessary for an effective fighting force.
Professional obligations require the individual’s reputational cost to be
subordinated to the reputational cost of the profession.

Professionalizing Special Operations Forces
Absent a professional framework, things can go wrong because they are also
going right. The professional framework demands the professional maintain the
45. Peter Olsthoorn, Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century (New York:
Routledge, 2011), 54–55.
46. Olsthoorn, Military Ethics, 49–50.
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client’s trust and get the job done in ways that reflect the client’s values. As the
foregoing analysis suggests, creating and integrating a professional framework
requires establishing a jurisdiction, creating expert knowledge, certifying members
in the knowledge, and developing a code of ethics governing the application of
expert knowledge.
Establish a Jurisdiction
For Abbott, professions establish themselves by competing over jurisdictions.47
Without its own jurisdiction, the special operations community is not fully
professionalized. James Burk describes a professional jurisdiction as the
domain within which expert knowledge is applied. This domain is physical,
such as a hospital, courtroom, or battlefield. The domain, however, is equally
conceptual—for example, health, justice, or defense.48 Both physical and
conceptual domains can be further divided, creating additional professional
spaces. Given the four physical domains of warfighting have been claimed by
other services, special operations will have to look below the threshold of war
to find its place.49
Competition below the threshold of war is a natural fit for special operations.
In the 1960s, US President John F. Kennedy reoriented US Army Special Forces
to focus on unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency to combat the spread
of communism while avoiding escalation with the Soviet Union.50 More recently,
General Richard Clarke, commander of US Special Operations Command, stated
the future of special operations entails working with critical allies and partners
to ensure access, placement, and influence. The future of special operations also
involves ensuring the success of relevant information operations intended to
deny adversaries the ability to spread disinformation.51 These activities are critical
to how the Department of Defense supports international competition.
To claim a jurisdiction is not to say other services do not play a role. Rather,
in doing so a profession takes responsibility for success within that jurisdiction,
allowing other contributions to have maximal positive impact. Currently, no
single service or other entity owns the competitive space below the threshold

47. Abbott, “Theory of Professions,” 534.
48. James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in The Future of the
Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Gail L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 49–50.
49. JCS, Joint Operations, IV-1.
50. Allan R. Millet, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the
United States from 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012), 624–25.
51. Howard Altman, “The Future of SOF: Exclusive Interview with SOCOM Commander Richard Clarke,”
Military Times (website), May 20, 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/05/20/the
-future-of-sof-exclusive-interview-with-socom-commander-richard-clarke/.
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of war. Moreover, the other services have jurisdictions above the threshold that
take priority.
Create Expert Knowledge and a Process to Certify Professionals
Professional knowledge goes beyond the development of skills. Abbott
states professional knowledge is abstract in that it legitimizes professional
work; establishes the research necessary to diagnose, treat, and make inferences
about the problems professionals solve; and constructs the standards of instruction
from which the profession certifies its members. Additionally, professional
knowledge supports innovation because it reveals underlying regularities that
relying on skill does not.52
A significant challenge for professionalizing special operations is the diversity
of skills involved, including direct-action operations, foreign internal defense,
security force assistance, information operations, and civil affairs.53 Given this
range, seeing how these skills could be unified under one professional education
umbrella might be difficult. A professional jurisdiction will inform how the
profession educates and trains each member to apply each required skill.
Creating expert knowledge and its certification process means significant
investment in professional military education that focuses on the demands of
special operations. Special operations could still rely on the service components for
recruitment, accession, and training but would need to have greater involvement
in, if not oversight of, its programs (as the Comprehensive Review recommends).
Additionally, special operations must create a career-long standard of education
that produces professionals capable of stewarding the profession at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels.
Develop a Code of Ethics
With a jurisdiction and expert knowledge established, special operations
will be in a position to establish and administer a professional ethic that
accounts for what the special operator, as a highly skilled individual, does;
who the special operator, as a moral agent, is; and what special operations, as
an institution, should achieve. Properly constructed, a robust professional
ethic describes the duties, outcomes, and character traits associated with
good special operators. Moreover, a professional ethic is not passive. Avoiding

52. Abbott, System of Professions, 56–57.
53. “Core Activities,” USSOCOM (website), accessed on July 12, 2021, https://www.socom.mil/about/core
-activities.
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ethical wrongdoing is not good enough; a professional must proactively seek
to do good.54
Developing such an ethic will be complex given the relative paucity of norms
below the threshold of war. Further complicating matters, no professional
ethic involves the effective provision of a service. Society gives professionals
the authority to engage in activities society does not grant nonprofessionals
because these activities could lead to harm. Especially in the military context,
professionals must further gain and sustain moral authority. In addition to
the functional imperative of the profession, professionals must integrate
social norms and relevant legislation, including international law and treaties,
into practice and their personal values.55

Conclusion
Implementing any of these recommendations, much less all of them, would
raise several concerns. The most obvious is designating a special operations
jurisdiction would place the organization on the same level as the other services.
This effect was almost achieved when then-Secretary of Defense Christopher
Miller directed the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and
low-intensity conflict to report directly to him, as other service secretaries
do.56 Current Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, however, partially reversed
this decision when he moved the position back under the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, where the position focuses on the broad
policies associated with its functional imperative. Nevertheless, Austin retained
a direct line over administrative matters involving organization, training, and
equipment.57 The reversal effectively provided additional oversight by the
Department of Defense without the additional autonomy US Special Operations
Command would have gained as a service equivalent.
Other concerns follow from the “chicken-and-egg” situation in which special
operations finds itself. To professionalize fully, special operations must set
itself apart from the other service professions. From a bureaucratic perspective,
this distinction would place special operations in competition rather than
collaboration with the other services. This competition could affect access
54. C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R. Beurskens, “Introduction,” in Maintaining the High Ground: The
Profession and the Ethic in Large-Scale Combat Operations, ed. C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R. Beurskens
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021), 2.
55. Anthony Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2004), 74–75.
56. Corey Dickstein, “Acting Defense Secretary Orders Top Special Operations Civilian to Report Directly
to Him,” Stars and Stripes (website), November 18, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/acting-defense
-secretary-orders-top-special-ops-civilian-to-report-directly-to-him-1.652557.
57. Lara Seligman, “Austin Rolls Back Trump-Era Policy on Special Ops,” Politico (website), May 5, 2021,
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/05/lloyd-austin-defense-special-ops-policy-485432.
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to important resources service components currently provide, making full
separation from the services difficult. The growing importance and complexity
of competition below the threshold of war and the distraction created by the
competition from the equally important task of warfighting suggest special
operations’ evolution into a full profession is in the organization’s interests.
Multiple options exist to move special operations from its current state
to one with the resources necessary to recruit, train, assess, and employ
effective individuals and teams that can avoid the current ethical failures of
the organization. Something like professionalization in the sense described
here must happen. Additionally, nothing is wrong with developing an ethics
curriculum to sensitize individuals to what is ethically relevant.
Without a professional framework, these measures will do little to set
conditions for better ethical behavior. Fixing force generation and operational
tempo will ensure a highly skilled force that may be blind to how functional
imperatives (like high social cohesion) can encourage unethical behavior. While
teaching individual ethics may better enable special operators to talk about ethics,
it cannot make them care about ethics. Divorced from the calling a professional
identity provides, individuals will have little reason to take the hard right and
avoid the easy wrong—and little reason to hold themselves accountable for
attaining the professional ideal.
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